Let’s refine the disclosure standards
A LOT of money doesn’t make one project better. Let’s get that straight. First. Foremost.
The thick flow of mega projects costing tens of billions of ringgit has hogged space in local business sheets in recent months. One can’t be blamed for being overwhelmed, let alone trying to digest the social, economic and the environmental implications of these projects.
So you’d think that it would have been easy for a RM700mil project to get buried under the thicket of limelight, left alone to do its thing quietly, fuss-free until absolutely necessary for it to come out. Not this one (although, quite surprisingly, it almost did).
It was the New York Times which lifted the dusty cloak off the “colossal project” being built in a small, industrial town in Kuantan, Pahang called Gebeng. Potentially, Malaysia will be host to the world’s largest and first refinery for rare-earth metals outside China, which is being built by a subsidiary of Lynas Corp, a major public-listed Australian mining company. The plant’s targeted completion date is the third quarter of this year.
Why would the New York Times, followed by a herd of Australian, Japanese and Canadian leading newspapers which played up this angle over the week, give a rip about this project, which in relative terms (US$250mil) was not mega, you ask? (After all, the last time in recent memory that a New York-based newspaper dedicated editorial space to Malaysia, it was on the social scene of a “chubby” Malaysian’s glitzy and lavish lifestyle in Manhattan).
Here’s why: China’s controls 97% of the world’s rare-earths industry. Its sheer dominance of these precious commodities, which many countries rely on for their business and national security needs, has been a rattling point for major consumers such as the United States, the European Union and Japan. (Rare earths are found in cell phones, radar and high-end applications, including compact fluorescent light bulbs, flat-panel displays, iPads, automotive catalytic converters and rechargeable batteries for electric and hybrid vehicles, among many other things).
Not helping is Beijing’s perceived arrogance over its near monopoly. It recently moved to limit its rare-earth exports which further cemented the nagging suspicion that it is hoarding the crucial elements.
And now, the crux: if Malaysia’s rare-earth project takes off, the refinery could meet nearly a third of the world’s (ex-China) demand for rare-earth materials, which would dilute the leverage China currently basks in. Indeed, this could very well be the balm to soothe the frayed nerves of the Americans, Europeans and Japanese.
Sadly, closer to home, it’s au contraire; this very project is drawing heated criticisms, not least due to its potential hazards. Rare earths may not be radioactive themselves but almost every rare-earth ore deposit contains, in varying degrees, a slightly radioactive element.
The project itself is not new. In fact, it has been in the making for eight years before it commenced in 2008. In early 2009, it hit a snag for reasons not quite clear, which led to an abrupt halt in works. By the time work resumed in late 2009, it was forgotten – up to now.
But questions abound. If the United States is currently aggressively pushing for research and development of these elements in order to eventually spur private investments in this sector, perhaps Malaysia, a developing economy, should walk before it runs as well?
Has a detailed feasibility study been carried out from the socio-environment perspective and was one carried out before the construction of the plant had begun? If so, can we have a look-see, please?
Malaysia’s track record in this area is not blemish-free. In 1985, a rare-earth refinery in Bukit Merah, Perak was set up and eventually shut down in 1992 due to a radioactive botch up; the mess, till today, is still being cleaned up by Japan’s Mitsubishi Chemicals in an exercise that is said to cost US$100mil.
The Malaysian public, and especially the people of Gebeng, deserve to be convinced and assuaged that this new refinery is safe. What they don’t deserve is to watch the processing plant being built to completion with little or no information forthcoming.
If the United States, Canada and Australia have rare earths but had stopped mining them in the 1990s, then why are we getting into this?
Those with political wiles will say that this project draws in the much-needed foreign direct investment into the country while creating job opportunities. But that still does not steal away the imperative for the Malaysian public to have access to sufficient information throughout the process of the project.
This task does not have to be borne by the Government alone. Surely Lynas, with a market value of A$3.5bil can pitch in, especially given its experience dealing with the even more vociferous ultra-green lobbyists in Australia?
● Business editor Anita Gabriel thinks public wrangling over controversial projects can be drastically reduced if those involved pay careful attention to reaching out to the masses. Is that so hard to do?
Sunday, March 13, 2011
Sunday, March 6, 2011
A dearth of CEO talent. Really?
IS banker Datuk Tajuddin Atan, ex-boss of RHB Capital Bhd, an exceptional candidate to head Bursa Malaysia Bhd?
If you pause or shrug your shoulder, it could mean less that Tajuddin is a poor choice but more of this - if a candidate whose professional track record is not glaringly relevant to the new job as head of the stock exchange, could we then be choosing less than the best available candidate?
Bursa Malaysia needs to do a great deal of heavy lifting to woo quality companies, local and foreign, to list on its platform amidst an extraordinary global wave of exchange mergers promising to crank up competition. That’s also the unfinished job left behind by his predecessor Datuk Yusli Mohamed Yusoff.
Can an individual from a different field fill these gaps? Can Bursa afford to have a CEO with a resume, impressive nevertheless, which suggests he knows very little about marketing a stock exchange, courting investors/companies, cracking down on misconduct and creating a robust liquid trading platform? And does Bursa have the luxury, in an environment bursting with competition, for its CEO to be learning on the job?
(Note: Tajuddin may well outperform expectations but that’s really not the point of this column).
Tan Sri Zarinah Anwar’s term as the Securities Commission chairman, it is believed, will be extended by one year come April.
And if market wags are to be believed, Zarinah had wanted to step down but instead, was asked to stay on as the search for a successor had been in vain.
That throws up more questions.
Is our top talent pool so thin that those in a position to decide on such high-profile appointments have to keep wading in the same waters?
Zarinah’s term expires end March but there’s nary an official word on that. On the other hand, in Hong Kong, things are vastly different.
The CEO search for Hong Kong’s Securities & Futures Commission has begun with admirable openness - the selection panel recently put out an ad in the South China Morning Post on the global search for a CEO, both local and foreign, five months before the departure of its current CEO Martin Wheatley. Wheatley, who had worked with the London Stock Exchange for 18 years, will end his six-year tenure with the Hong Kong market regulator in June this year.
In Singapore, the recruitment process for the top seat of its stock exchange SGX, literally walks the extra mile, casting its net far and wide for a suitable candidate. In mid 2009, Swede Magnus Bocker, who was prior to that the executive vice-president of Nasdaq OMX Group, which owns and operates the Nasdaq stock market and seven European stock exchanges in the Nordic and Baltic regions, was appointed to helm the exchange which is Asia’s second largest listed bourse.
On the other hand, there is also the argument that one need not look that far in the CEO hunt and that there could be potential successors within the organisation.
“The best internal candidates often aren’t broadly known outside the company, but that doesn’t mean they should be discarded. Such a candidate is often greeted with a yawn and perhaps even disappointment from outside the company, but goes on to great success,” Professor Joseph Grundfest, a former commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission had reportedly said some time back, when asked to comment on the dearth of CEO talent on Wall Street.
Executive search firm Egon Zehnder International provides the flipside (in an article posted on its website): “Internal candidates have been promoted and evaluated on the basis of their performance, not their potential. Their experiences and their accomplishments, no matter how impressive, simply may not be relevant to what the company will need most.”
Malaysia, with a much-trumpeted aspiration to turn itself into a high-income nation and plan to draw talent back into the country, needs to seriously assess the way it scours the landscape for suitable candidates to head prominent institutions, including government-linked companies. It is not that the choices are flawed, but merely that they are perceivably, not a result of an exhaustive hunt.
* Business editor Anita Gabriel understands that the search for CEOs or those in top spots can be exasperating. But there exists a nagging suspicion that apart from merit and virtue, there are other over riding factors limiting the hunt.
If you pause or shrug your shoulder, it could mean less that Tajuddin is a poor choice but more of this - if a candidate whose professional track record is not glaringly relevant to the new job as head of the stock exchange, could we then be choosing less than the best available candidate?
Bursa Malaysia needs to do a great deal of heavy lifting to woo quality companies, local and foreign, to list on its platform amidst an extraordinary global wave of exchange mergers promising to crank up competition. That’s also the unfinished job left behind by his predecessor Datuk Yusli Mohamed Yusoff.
Can an individual from a different field fill these gaps? Can Bursa afford to have a CEO with a resume, impressive nevertheless, which suggests he knows very little about marketing a stock exchange, courting investors/companies, cracking down on misconduct and creating a robust liquid trading platform? And does Bursa have the luxury, in an environment bursting with competition, for its CEO to be learning on the job?
(Note: Tajuddin may well outperform expectations but that’s really not the point of this column).
Tan Sri Zarinah Anwar’s term as the Securities Commission chairman, it is believed, will be extended by one year come April.
And if market wags are to be believed, Zarinah had wanted to step down but instead, was asked to stay on as the search for a successor had been in vain.
That throws up more questions.
Is our top talent pool so thin that those in a position to decide on such high-profile appointments have to keep wading in the same waters?
Zarinah’s term expires end March but there’s nary an official word on that. On the other hand, in Hong Kong, things are vastly different.
The CEO search for Hong Kong’s Securities & Futures Commission has begun with admirable openness - the selection panel recently put out an ad in the South China Morning Post on the global search for a CEO, both local and foreign, five months before the departure of its current CEO Martin Wheatley. Wheatley, who had worked with the London Stock Exchange for 18 years, will end his six-year tenure with the Hong Kong market regulator in June this year.
In Singapore, the recruitment process for the top seat of its stock exchange SGX, literally walks the extra mile, casting its net far and wide for a suitable candidate. In mid 2009, Swede Magnus Bocker, who was prior to that the executive vice-president of Nasdaq OMX Group, which owns and operates the Nasdaq stock market and seven European stock exchanges in the Nordic and Baltic regions, was appointed to helm the exchange which is Asia’s second largest listed bourse.
On the other hand, there is also the argument that one need not look that far in the CEO hunt and that there could be potential successors within the organisation.
“The best internal candidates often aren’t broadly known outside the company, but that doesn’t mean they should be discarded. Such a candidate is often greeted with a yawn and perhaps even disappointment from outside the company, but goes on to great success,” Professor Joseph Grundfest, a former commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission had reportedly said some time back, when asked to comment on the dearth of CEO talent on Wall Street.
Executive search firm Egon Zehnder International provides the flipside (in an article posted on its website): “Internal candidates have been promoted and evaluated on the basis of their performance, not their potential. Their experiences and their accomplishments, no matter how impressive, simply may not be relevant to what the company will need most.”
Malaysia, with a much-trumpeted aspiration to turn itself into a high-income nation and plan to draw talent back into the country, needs to seriously assess the way it scours the landscape for suitable candidates to head prominent institutions, including government-linked companies. It is not that the choices are flawed, but merely that they are perceivably, not a result of an exhaustive hunt.
* Business editor Anita Gabriel understands that the search for CEOs or those in top spots can be exasperating. But there exists a nagging suspicion that apart from merit and virtue, there are other over riding factors limiting the hunt.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Big fry, small fry ...
Everyone’s accountable at some point
WHEN it rains, it pours.
Over the week, another three directors of a public listed company dropped the ball - or so it was alleged. The directors from INIX Technologies Bhd were charged by the Securities Commission for making false statements in four quarterly reports as well as their prospectus to Bursa Malaysia .
Haven’t we seen loads where that comes from in the past year or so? In fact, as far as alleged transgressions or corporate malfeasance go, this may appear meek compared to certain blue chips that have fallen off their high horse.
Nevertheless, this case presents an interesting trait. The directors were not the only ones charged.
The company’s senior finance executive and ex-accounts clerk were also charged for “failure to provide evidence to the SC as required under the law”.
Under Section 134 (5) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 on the Power to Call for examination, the SC can throw the book at anyone who fails to appear before an investigating officer; refuses to answer any question put to him by the officer or neglects to give any information which may reasonably be required which he has in his power to give; or knowingly furnishes information or statement that is false or misleading in any material.
The penalty, if found guilty - a fine of RM1mil and above and a maximum prison time of five years.
Indeed, adequately intimidating (as intended) for any rank and file staff in the bottom half of a company’s food chain.
Frankly, for just about anyone, really.
But the equilibrium in such instances is wobbly. Think about it - while corporate bigwigs may have the means to hire savvy (euphemism for crafty) attorneys to find some loopholes to wiggle themselves out of these charges, clerical staff, for example, can generally ill afford such highly-priced legal guidance.
So, ultimately, who is really paying a bigger price for the actual offence?
It does however drive home one big point - combating fraud or corporate misdeeds is EVERYONE’s responsibility.
Separately, a governance hawk with a yee-sang fetish recently wrote to me about an issue he holds very close to his heart, entitled “Corporate Governance in Malaysia - a travesty of good intention”.
As he is a long-time industry participant and critic (arm-chair and otherwise, as he also holds key positions in certain high level “talkshops” for change and reforms), he presents some thoughts on the countless moves by our securities regulators to restore trust by strengthening the quality of governance in the system.
More specifically, he refers to the setting up of the AOB (Audit Oversight Board) and the SC’s plan to set up an International Corporate Governance Consultative Committee, tasked to advise, challenge and establish a new set of policy recommendations.
Another committee is also in the process of being set up by the Institute of Internal Auditors (Malaysia) to relook at the Corporate Governance Code and review the “Guidance Note to Directors of Public Listed Companies: Statement on Internal Controls.”
He writes:
“To many of us, all of that sounds very good and promising. At last we are not merely paying lip service but are doing something about it. But will things change?
Recall in early 2000, when we introduced the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, the Guidance Note to Directors of Public Listed Companies: Statement on Internal Controls and revamped the Listing Rules, we believed at that stage that we had a sound framework to improve the governance and reporting framework in Malaysia. We thought we had all the necessary prerequisites to make it work.
As time progressed, we moved from governance based on conformance to a performance paradigm. The country was doing well and everybody was pleased with that. But in the early part of the second half of the decade, we were rudely awaken by our own Enrons - Transmile Group Bhd, Megan Media Holdings Bhd and a slew of other financial reporting fraud cases.
To address the situation, amendments were made to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and Practice Notes issued by Bursa and Companies Act (2007) were introduced. Still, corporate malfeasance persisted.
So, what makes us think that it would work this time? The sad reality is that corporate misdeeds will continue to occur. There is enough historical data globally to support this point. Regulators in many more developed jurisdictions have come out with stricter rules and regulation but after a few honeymoon years that had lulled us into “everything seems okay” mode, the bad news comes trickling back in again.
Was it not at the start of the previous decade that the New York Stock Exchange required all its companies to spend vast sums of money to identify financial and reporting risks and put in place appropriate controls (thanks to Senator Sarbane and Congressman Oxley) and yet, less than ten years later, we had the global financial meltdown emanating from the very companies that adopted these frameworks? This same country instituted the formation of the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), to regulate the auditors (and we have adopted the AOB) but corporate failures have in fact heightened.
So, where does the solution lie? A more capitalist open market where the fittest survive and failures are accepted as the norm, where investors must be prepared for real risks and rewards? More revamp of the regulatory framework? Or does it rest in something more basic and fundamental?
Are company directors the only guilty parties? While they are responsible and accountable for the stewardship of the company, they do place a fair amount of reliance on expert advisors who earn tidy sums for their services. But as advisors, they seemed to have escaped the risk reward paradigm - they can earn huge amounts of money but not be held accountable. How is that? To cut a long story short, I don’t think we need more committees or more revamp of frameworks, rules and regulations. Really, it’s about making what we already have work for us.”
I think he’s right. We do have the necessary deterrences - and some.
We don’t need to throw more money, plump up the fat rule book, have more elaborate codes or set up countless committees. As the saying goes - crooks bent on stealing from a company will take their chances and find some way to do it anyway.
● Business editor Anita Gabriel wonders if it’s possible to legislate a sense of morality. If I know of a wrong doing, could I possibly be committing an offence if I don’t squeal on the wrong-doer?
Everyone’s accountable at some point
WHEN it rains, it pours.
Over the week, another three directors of a public listed company dropped the ball - or so it was alleged. The directors from INIX Technologies Bhd were charged by the Securities Commission for making false statements in four quarterly reports as well as their prospectus to Bursa Malaysia .
Haven’t we seen loads where that comes from in the past year or so? In fact, as far as alleged transgressions or corporate malfeasance go, this may appear meek compared to certain blue chips that have fallen off their high horse.
Nevertheless, this case presents an interesting trait. The directors were not the only ones charged.
The company’s senior finance executive and ex-accounts clerk were also charged for “failure to provide evidence to the SC as required under the law”.
Under Section 134 (5) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 on the Power to Call for examination, the SC can throw the book at anyone who fails to appear before an investigating officer; refuses to answer any question put to him by the officer or neglects to give any information which may reasonably be required which he has in his power to give; or knowingly furnishes information or statement that is false or misleading in any material.
The penalty, if found guilty - a fine of RM1mil and above and a maximum prison time of five years.
Indeed, adequately intimidating (as intended) for any rank and file staff in the bottom half of a company’s food chain.
Frankly, for just about anyone, really.
But the equilibrium in such instances is wobbly. Think about it - while corporate bigwigs may have the means to hire savvy (euphemism for crafty) attorneys to find some loopholes to wiggle themselves out of these charges, clerical staff, for example, can generally ill afford such highly-priced legal guidance.
So, ultimately, who is really paying a bigger price for the actual offence?
It does however drive home one big point - combating fraud or corporate misdeeds is EVERYONE’s responsibility.
Separately, a governance hawk with a yee-sang fetish recently wrote to me about an issue he holds very close to his heart, entitled “Corporate Governance in Malaysia - a travesty of good intention”.
As he is a long-time industry participant and critic (arm-chair and otherwise, as he also holds key positions in certain high level “talkshops” for change and reforms), he presents some thoughts on the countless moves by our securities regulators to restore trust by strengthening the quality of governance in the system.
More specifically, he refers to the setting up of the AOB (Audit Oversight Board) and the SC’s plan to set up an International Corporate Governance Consultative Committee, tasked to advise, challenge and establish a new set of policy recommendations.
Another committee is also in the process of being set up by the Institute of Internal Auditors (Malaysia) to relook at the Corporate Governance Code and review the “Guidance Note to Directors of Public Listed Companies: Statement on Internal Controls.”
He writes:
“To many of us, all of that sounds very good and promising. At last we are not merely paying lip service but are doing something about it. But will things change?
Recall in early 2000, when we introduced the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, the Guidance Note to Directors of Public Listed Companies: Statement on Internal Controls and revamped the Listing Rules, we believed at that stage that we had a sound framework to improve the governance and reporting framework in Malaysia. We thought we had all the necessary prerequisites to make it work.
As time progressed, we moved from governance based on conformance to a performance paradigm. The country was doing well and everybody was pleased with that. But in the early part of the second half of the decade, we were rudely awaken by our own Enrons - Transmile Group Bhd, Megan Media Holdings Bhd and a slew of other financial reporting fraud cases.
To address the situation, amendments were made to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and Practice Notes issued by Bursa and Companies Act (2007) were introduced. Still, corporate malfeasance persisted.
So, what makes us think that it would work this time? The sad reality is that corporate misdeeds will continue to occur. There is enough historical data globally to support this point. Regulators in many more developed jurisdictions have come out with stricter rules and regulation but after a few honeymoon years that had lulled us into “everything seems okay” mode, the bad news comes trickling back in again.
Was it not at the start of the previous decade that the New York Stock Exchange required all its companies to spend vast sums of money to identify financial and reporting risks and put in place appropriate controls (thanks to Senator Sarbane and Congressman Oxley) and yet, less than ten years later, we had the global financial meltdown emanating from the very companies that adopted these frameworks? This same country instituted the formation of the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), to regulate the auditors (and we have adopted the AOB) but corporate failures have in fact heightened.
So, where does the solution lie? A more capitalist open market where the fittest survive and failures are accepted as the norm, where investors must be prepared for real risks and rewards? More revamp of the regulatory framework? Or does it rest in something more basic and fundamental?
Are company directors the only guilty parties? While they are responsible and accountable for the stewardship of the company, they do place a fair amount of reliance on expert advisors who earn tidy sums for their services. But as advisors, they seemed to have escaped the risk reward paradigm - they can earn huge amounts of money but not be held accountable. How is that? To cut a long story short, I don’t think we need more committees or more revamp of frameworks, rules and regulations. Really, it’s about making what we already have work for us.”
I think he’s right. We do have the necessary deterrences - and some.
We don’t need to throw more money, plump up the fat rule book, have more elaborate codes or set up countless committees. As the saying goes - crooks bent on stealing from a company will take their chances and find some way to do it anyway.
● Business editor Anita Gabriel wonders if it’s possible to legislate a sense of morality. If I know of a wrong doing, could I possibly be committing an offence if I don’t squeal on the wrong-doer?
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Piecing together the Jetson puzzle
Just what is going on at the construction group?
IT’S hard to fault investors of Kumpulan Jetson Bhd who are nonplussed by the events taking place at the company in recent months. The most recent has to do with the resignation of an independent director.
According to the company in its response to a query by Bursa Malaysia, three things had happened on July 7. The company had received Mohd Najib Abdul Aziz’s resignation dated July 7; it also received an email on the same day from him retracting the resignation. But here’s the clincher – the company still went ahead and announced the resignation.
Two days after that, the company announced that it had received another letter from Najib stating the resignation is invalid. However, the company had replied to Najib that the “resignation is valid and a subsequent retraction or change of heart does not change the resignation.”
Conclusion – was his a forced resignation? Could Najib have had a change of heart – all within a span of a day? Or could the board be split? Maybe. If it was a “friendly” board, perhaps there would have been no hurry to announce the resignation given the retraction.
What piqued the curiosity is the level of disclosure or lack thereof, particularly at a time when wary investors are demanding more transparency.
There was hardly any explanation why Najib, who has served the board for nine years as independent, non-executive director and chairman of the audit committee, and who had just a month ago offered himself to be re-elected at an annual general meeting, had resigned in the first place and what led to his retraction.
Even more puzzling is that on July 14, trading in the company’s shares was halted – for an hour. What for, you ask? This – to announce Najib’s retraction of resignation via fax and that the board had scheduled a meeting the day after to discuss the implications of this.
The market must have sniffed something amiss. The stock price plunged 22 sen or 17% that day upon resumption of trade, closing at its low of RM1.11. Then, puzzlingly, it rose again the next day by 44 sen or 40% on unusually heavy trading volume. Unlike in November last year, when Bursa Malaysia issued an unusual market activity query on the back of substantial exuberance in the counter, this time, there was none.
Bursa Malaysia did, however, request the company to make an announcement to clarify the circumstances surrounding the resignation of Najib. But even this failed to shed some new light except a response by the company that the lawyer appointed by the board to consider the various issues regarding Najib’s resignation was of the opinion that it was “properly executed” and is “valid”. Nevertheless, the board, it said, has unanimously agreed to seek a second legal opinion on the matter.
Just about a year ago (Aug 20, to be exact), the Naza brothers Sheikh Mohd Nasarudin and Sheikh Mohd Faliq through privately held Superior Pavilion Sdn Bhd, bought a 33% block from the company’s co-founders – Isnin Rahim (then chairman and executive director) and brothers Datuk Teh Kian Ann (group managing director) and Tee Keng Kok (executive director), among others.
Following that, in November, Nasarudin was appointed chairman and Faliq vice-chairman. Both are executive directors of Jetson. As they had crossed the takeover trigger point, a mandatory general offer was done but it flopped because the stock price, for some strange reason, had skyrocketed way above the offer price (70 sen which was later revised to RM1).
The thing is there has been very little taking place at the company which warrants the level of fervour the counter has been attracting. Except for this – in December last year, the Naza Group, through its wholly owned TTDI KL Metropolis Sdn Bhd tied up with Jetson to form a 51:49 joint venture to develop the Matrade Centre, the country’s largest exhibition centre. Jetson will get the contract to develop the Matrade Centre for RM628mil. But can the Matrade Centre project take off smoothly if the board is indeed split?
When the Naza brothers entered the company, investors deemed the development as a move to inject fresh blood (and with that, fresh jobs) into the company. After Matrade, they could still be waiting for more to happen.
In the works is a plan to improve the governance benchmark of listed companies. Bursa Malaysia has proposed to amend its listing requirements and introduce a Corporate Disclosure Guide. One of the proposed measures includes listed companies disclosing reasons for the resignation or change of directors. There’s been a lot of that going on in the local bourse of late.
If only these measures had come together much sooner…
● Business editor Anita Gabriel wonders what’s going on at our stock exchange. Just far too many puzzling developments.
IT’S hard to fault investors of Kumpulan Jetson Bhd who are nonplussed by the events taking place at the company in recent months. The most recent has to do with the resignation of an independent director.
According to the company in its response to a query by Bursa Malaysia, three things had happened on July 7. The company had received Mohd Najib Abdul Aziz’s resignation dated July 7; it also received an email on the same day from him retracting the resignation. But here’s the clincher – the company still went ahead and announced the resignation.
Two days after that, the company announced that it had received another letter from Najib stating the resignation is invalid. However, the company had replied to Najib that the “resignation is valid and a subsequent retraction or change of heart does not change the resignation.”
Conclusion – was his a forced resignation? Could Najib have had a change of heart – all within a span of a day? Or could the board be split? Maybe. If it was a “friendly” board, perhaps there would have been no hurry to announce the resignation given the retraction.
What piqued the curiosity is the level of disclosure or lack thereof, particularly at a time when wary investors are demanding more transparency.
There was hardly any explanation why Najib, who has served the board for nine years as independent, non-executive director and chairman of the audit committee, and who had just a month ago offered himself to be re-elected at an annual general meeting, had resigned in the first place and what led to his retraction.
Even more puzzling is that on July 14, trading in the company’s shares was halted – for an hour. What for, you ask? This – to announce Najib’s retraction of resignation via fax and that the board had scheduled a meeting the day after to discuss the implications of this.
The market must have sniffed something amiss. The stock price plunged 22 sen or 17% that day upon resumption of trade, closing at its low of RM1.11. Then, puzzlingly, it rose again the next day by 44 sen or 40% on unusually heavy trading volume. Unlike in November last year, when Bursa Malaysia issued an unusual market activity query on the back of substantial exuberance in the counter, this time, there was none.
Bursa Malaysia did, however, request the company to make an announcement to clarify the circumstances surrounding the resignation of Najib. But even this failed to shed some new light except a response by the company that the lawyer appointed by the board to consider the various issues regarding Najib’s resignation was of the opinion that it was “properly executed” and is “valid”. Nevertheless, the board, it said, has unanimously agreed to seek a second legal opinion on the matter.
Just about a year ago (Aug 20, to be exact), the Naza brothers Sheikh Mohd Nasarudin and Sheikh Mohd Faliq through privately held Superior Pavilion Sdn Bhd, bought a 33% block from the company’s co-founders – Isnin Rahim (then chairman and executive director) and brothers Datuk Teh Kian Ann (group managing director) and Tee Keng Kok (executive director), among others.
Following that, in November, Nasarudin was appointed chairman and Faliq vice-chairman. Both are executive directors of Jetson. As they had crossed the takeover trigger point, a mandatory general offer was done but it flopped because the stock price, for some strange reason, had skyrocketed way above the offer price (70 sen which was later revised to RM1).
The thing is there has been very little taking place at the company which warrants the level of fervour the counter has been attracting. Except for this – in December last year, the Naza Group, through its wholly owned TTDI KL Metropolis Sdn Bhd tied up with Jetson to form a 51:49 joint venture to develop the Matrade Centre, the country’s largest exhibition centre. Jetson will get the contract to develop the Matrade Centre for RM628mil. But can the Matrade Centre project take off smoothly if the board is indeed split?
When the Naza brothers entered the company, investors deemed the development as a move to inject fresh blood (and with that, fresh jobs) into the company. After Matrade, they could still be waiting for more to happen.
In the works is a plan to improve the governance benchmark of listed companies. Bursa Malaysia has proposed to amend its listing requirements and introduce a Corporate Disclosure Guide. One of the proposed measures includes listed companies disclosing reasons for the resignation or change of directors. There’s been a lot of that going on in the local bourse of late.
If only these measures had come together much sooner…
● Business editor Anita Gabriel wonders what’s going on at our stock exchange. Just far too many puzzling developments.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Battle for Singapore's Parkway
As my stream of consciousness is just in the process of being nurtured, well, for this blog atleast,I will be posting, for starters, my articles and columns. Below, a piece I worked on for the past weekend issue of The StarBizWeek
How did Khazanah and Fortis get to this point?
IF Khazanah Nasional Bhd could turn back the clock, it would – right up to March this year. US buyout firm TPG Capital, which was looking to exit Singapore-listed Parkway Holdings Ltd, had offered its 23.9% block to Khazanah. On hindsight wisdom, if the state investment arm had grabbed the chance, it could have saved itself a sweet S$400mil (RM935mil).
But time was no friend. Khazanah had three days to make up its mind on a deal worth over RM2bil.
“It wasn’t a meaningful offer. Surely, Khazanah couldn’t commit that much in just three days,” says a source.
The “time bomb” was dictated by India’s Fortis Healthcare Ltd, which had made an exploding offer to TPG. Fortis had offered to buy TPG’s stake at S$3.56 a piece or S$959mil but it was only good for five days. To safeguard its own interest, the private equity firm, whose typical investment horizon of five years had just about expired in Parkway, snatched the offer, pocketing rewarding gains.
No point dwelling in the might-have-been, they say.
My way or the highway?
Days after its entry into Parkway, the aggressive Singh brothers, one of India’s wealthiest billionaires who control the Fortis Group – India’s second largest hospital operator with a market value of US$1.1bil – wasted no time to mark their territory. They replaced four TPG nominee directors with their very own. Malvinder Mohan Singh or Malvi as he is widely known, flew right into the chairman’s seat and uprooted himself from his home base in New Delhi, India to Singapore. “It shows how serious the Singh brothers were about Parkway and their plans to build this Pan-Asian healthcare platform,” says a source close to them.
Khazanah, more specifically its nominee directors on the Parkway board, Datuk Azlan Hashim (Khazanah director), Ganen Sarvananthan (executive director of investments) and Ahmad Shahizam Shariff (director of Khazanah’s Integrated Healthcare Holdings Ltd (IHHL)) were in for a surprise. Realisation set in that unlike Khazanah’s cosy rapport with TPG, built over the years, there was simply no chemistry with Fortis. That, and this – Khazanah’s disproportionate representation in the board (2 versus Fortis’ 4) and Fortis’ assertion for control soured the ties, driving a wedge between them.
“Fortis was in business with Khazanah. It wanted Fortis to acknowledge that both of them have significant stakes so there’s really no justification that there ought to be disproportionate say in how the company should be run. But Fortis wanted control from the outset,” claimed a source. “They asked Khazanah to have faith and show support but what that essentially meant is they wanted it their way,” said the source.
The Singh brothers – both Malvi and Shivi (Shivinder) are reputed to be very hands on in the companies they own and would not hesitate to change the status quo in companies they’ve bought into by upsetting the management line-up.
But those who work closely with them, scoff at that notion.
“They’ve got trusted people whom they’ve put in the right place in all their businesses. So, they don’t meddle on a micro level. If the managers are able and are true blue professionals, why remove them? The Singhs set the vision for the group. So, I don’t think it’s fair to say they want control or to upset the management structure at Parkway,” said a source close to the brothers.
Incidentally, in April this year, the brothers, with a combined net worth of US$3bil, stepped down from the board of Religare Enterprise, a one-stop financial services firm they founded in 1984, which sparked rumours of a possible sale of the financial arm to focus on their pet project – healthcare. The news of a possible sale has since been denied.
In place, they hired their trusted lieutenants, Sunil Godhwani and Shachindra Nath as chairman and CEO respectively of Religare, both of whom played key roles in advising the Singhs on the fight for Parkway.
Disproportionate board
Since Khazanah’s entry into Parkway, it has had only two nominee directors on the board while TPG, the other substantial shareholder had four. For as long as both parties worked together, this was never quite a niggling point although it was one that Khazanah had hoped to address, but unfortunately, just not quickly enough. Fortis’ entry into Parkway turned this into a vulnerable spot and a major headache for the investment arm.
Khazanah’s repeated plea to nominate two more directors – its executive director of the investments division and country head for India Michael Fernandes and Tunku Mahmood Fawzy (he retired from his post as ED of investments in May this year) to Parkway’s board had come to naught. Having deferred the decision several times, it is believed that the board, led by Fortis, finally rejected the nominations. “They did this skillfully and artfully. They just wanted it their way,” said a source.
By April, the cracks had widened by the whole nine yards. At Parkway’s AGM on April 16, a Khazanah representative, Quek Pei Lynn, director of IHHL, stood up and read out from a piece of paper, publicly expressing the fund’s dissatisfaction over the board structure from the governance standpoint. “Khazanah wanted to make its stance well known that it disagreed with the board composition and that the governance issues needed to be examined,” said parties familiar with the matter.
In May, Malvinder came to Malaysia to meet with Khazanah’s boss Tan Sri Azman Mokhtar for the first time in the latter’s office at the Petronas Twin Towers.
The meeting produced no substantial outcome. Meant to break the ice between the two men sitting at the helm of their respective entities, there was only one thing that emerged clear from the session – there were divergent boundaries in their views, vision, culture and mindset.
Khazanah was left with three choices – exit, increase its stake incrementally to outflank Fortis or launch a takeover of Parkway. The first was not compelling given that healthcare was a strategic piece in its portfolio, while the second would have resulted in a dead lock.
Even so, a source close to Khazanah says the fund was “not sentimental or emotional about the asset”. “If Fortis wanted control, they could have done it. We asked them to make us an offer which should be made to others as well,” he said.
All that, of course, is now very much water under the bridge.
The poker game
On May 27, Malaysia’s wealth fund launched a partial takeover offer for Parkway shares at S$3.78 per share. “I think Fortis would have been surprised that Khazanah had not rolled over and played dead but instead made this big step,” says an observer.
Then, on July 1, merely seven days before the first closing date of Khazanah’s offer, Fortis retaliated with a counter bid for Parkway shares at S$3.80 per share, a paltry two sen premium over Khazanah’s bid. But here’s what made its offer more compelling - it involved a voluntary general offer, erasing the concerns of shareholders ending up with odd lots under Khazanah’s partial offer.
It seemed enough to swing the votes.
“Fortis didn’t have to pay anymore than they had to. Also, their potential capital outlay would have been three times that of Khazanah as it involved a GO,” says an observer.
At this point, many perceived that Fortis had the upper hand. But in reality, while Khazanah had an acceptable exit plan (it could accept Fortis’ offer and walk away with a decent gain; its average investment cost in Parkway stood at between S$3.20 and S$3.40 per share), for Fortis, Khazanah’s partial offer signalled an imperfect exit. “A partial offer is different from a GO. They were unequal offers. Fortis’ block was large, hence an inability to properly exit (through Khazanah’s offer) as they would have a chunk left behind,” said an observer.
The market was abuzz on Khazanah’s next move. But when the time was up, Khazanah decided to extend the deadline, leaving many, including Fortis, guessing on its game plan.
Those from the Fortis camp must have been peeved. “By extending the partial offer on the same terms, is Khazanah confusing shareholders on its intentions for Parkway? Isn’t this ambiguity in intent or lack of transparency not beneficial to Parkway’s shareholders and business? Could it possibly point to a lack of internal buy-in or an inability to line up financing?” said a source close to Fortis.
It was clear that Khazanah’s move to extend the deadline was largely tactical. “Buying time is always a good tactic. When time is on your side, why not use it to your advantage? Let the other party sweat it out and build its own assumptions. Your first price should never be the last price, in any bidding position. Khazanah also knew that S$3.80 may not be Fortis’ last price and could be good for one or two revisions,” said the source.
With that, as the final closing date of July 26 (Monday) started looming closer, the stakes were getting higher for all the players in this heated tussle for the control of Parkway and more so for Fortis. This proved enough to draw both warring factions back to the table.
Late Thursday (July 22), the advisers for both sides were locked in intense negotiations.
“The advisers were caught up in lengthy negotiations but the principles (of both firms) were holding the strings,” said the source.
Fortis was willing to exit but they wanted Khazanah to make a GO, which the latter was already planning to do after talks with other shareholders of Parkway. “The negotiations were not getting anywhere till the concept of GO was introduced,” said the source.
After going back and forth and countless text messages that proceeded well into the weekend, both parties, after months of dispute and distrust finally arrived at a mutual point. On Monday, Khazanah launched its GO at S$3.95 per Parkway share or S$3.5bil (RM8.2bil) with Fortis giving an irrevocable undertaking to accept the offer. The offer closes on Aug 16.
Still, many were surprised. “Khazanah must have been surprised that it landed on this so quickly. It was preparing for a long, hard slog,” says an observer.
The Singh brothers provide the explanation. “Every investment is done with a price point, rationale and game plan in mind. There will be a point beyond which we won’t pay. We were not keen to enter into a bidding war,” Malvinder said this in an interview with India’s The Economic Times over the week. “Parkway is a great asset but there is a value attached to it. We were a buyer to the point of S$3.80 a share, which was itself a stretched offer,” he added.
Shivinder Singh said: “At the end of the day, you have to take an economic call. You can’t take an emotional call on the assets you want to own.”
Game over? Pretty much – or so, it would seem.
Khazanah emerges victor in its bid to control Parkway while Fortis walks away, far from broken hearted, with a fat pay cheque and gain of S$117mil for a four-month long investment.
Singapore Inc’s stance
One main bridge that Khazanah had to cross in making the takeover offer for Parkway is whether or not Singapore Inc would accept a Malaysian wealth fund taking control of a strategic Singaporean asset.
Truth is, Parkway, which had started out a Singapore-centric, single-hospital organisation and morphed into a major provider of premium integrated healthcare service provider in the Asia with 16 hospitals and 60 clinics all over the region, for long has been largely foreign owned. As such, the “patriotic issues” are not expected to stir much rumblings among Singaporeans.
Of course, the reverse stands in stark contrast. In 2005, when Parkway acquired a 31% controlling stake in Malaysia’s Pantai Holdings Bhd, the issue of a national strategic asset with two lucrative medical concessions under the control of foreigners turned into a political hot potato in Malaysia.
To soothe the frayed nerves of critics, Khazanah swooped in mid-2006 and set up a special purpose vehicle Pantai Irama to acquire Parkway’s stake in Pantai, thereafter taking the latter private. Parkway ended up with 40% in Pantai Irama while the rest was controlled by Khazanah. In 2008, Khazanah acquired a 16% stake in Parkway, which it has since raised to the current 24%.
On the spotlight
What had taken many, especially governance hawks by surprise, is a pact that Fortis had signed with three key directors of Parkway which was revealed in an offer document to shareholders on Khazanah’s partial takeover bid (see chart).
Even this, shouldn’t have been a major shock, to Khazanah that is, as it is believed that two of the directors, Richard Seow and Dr Lim Cheok Peng, had a similar pact previously with TPG.
The agreement was to allow Fortis the right to direct how they should vote at board and shareholder meetings. For as long as TPG was on the other side of this agreement, there was no beef as both TPG and Khazanah were on the same page on how they planned to drive the healthcare group.
This all changed with Fortis’ entry. The make-up of Fortis and TPG is vastly different. Unlike TPG which is a private equity firm, Fortis is a leading operator of healthcare assets. It founded and is running a huge Indian healthcare group with 48 hospitals and 101 healthcare centres across Asia. So, given its operational expertise, it can be appreciated if it had its own views on how best to steer Parkway.
“Parkway will benefit from the support and commitment of a focused strategic investor and its management. Five years of control by financial investors (read: Khazanah) has delivered limited benefit to Parkway,” a source close to Fortis had said earlier on in the tussle.
Interestingly, while Seow and Lim had entered into the agreement with Fortis on March 11, the same day Fortis had acquired the stake in Parkway from TPG, the third director, Dr Tan See Leng, the company’s managing director had sealed the deal a little later on March 26.
But here’s the crunch – with Fortis’ exit from Parkway, are these directors in for a handsome pay day? The contract with Fortis grants each director “a right to participate in certain economic benefits” in the event Fortis sells over 10% of its shares in Parkway.
“This may not be applicable if the contract stipulates a certain time frame for the agreement before the rights kick in, which may not match the current circumstances,” says an observer.
Whatever it is, it surely has outraged governance watchers: “This is an anathema to basic governance.”
Moral of the story
Let this saga, which thankfully didn’t stretch for longer than four months, be a lesson for both Fortis and Khazanah.
For Khazanah, this incident drives home the point on the vulnerabilities of investing in a company with a scattered shareholding and the importance of putting in place a structure, be it in terms of board composition or others, to safeguard its interest.
The lesson for Fortis, and no doubt for Khazanah as well, this tussle marks a classic do and don’t to avoid pitfalls for investors venturing into new markets – Never ever assume the markets they are entering into are the same as their own.
Otherwise, there’s always the risk of value overriding values.
How did Khazanah and Fortis get to this point?
IF Khazanah Nasional Bhd could turn back the clock, it would – right up to March this year. US buyout firm TPG Capital, which was looking to exit Singapore-listed Parkway Holdings Ltd, had offered its 23.9% block to Khazanah. On hindsight wisdom, if the state investment arm had grabbed the chance, it could have saved itself a sweet S$400mil (RM935mil).
But time was no friend. Khazanah had three days to make up its mind on a deal worth over RM2bil.
“It wasn’t a meaningful offer. Surely, Khazanah couldn’t commit that much in just three days,” says a source.
The “time bomb” was dictated by India’s Fortis Healthcare Ltd, which had made an exploding offer to TPG. Fortis had offered to buy TPG’s stake at S$3.56 a piece or S$959mil but it was only good for five days. To safeguard its own interest, the private equity firm, whose typical investment horizon of five years had just about expired in Parkway, snatched the offer, pocketing rewarding gains.
No point dwelling in the might-have-been, they say.
My way or the highway?
Days after its entry into Parkway, the aggressive Singh brothers, one of India’s wealthiest billionaires who control the Fortis Group – India’s second largest hospital operator with a market value of US$1.1bil – wasted no time to mark their territory. They replaced four TPG nominee directors with their very own. Malvinder Mohan Singh or Malvi as he is widely known, flew right into the chairman’s seat and uprooted himself from his home base in New Delhi, India to Singapore. “It shows how serious the Singh brothers were about Parkway and their plans to build this Pan-Asian healthcare platform,” says a source close to them.
Khazanah, more specifically its nominee directors on the Parkway board, Datuk Azlan Hashim (Khazanah director), Ganen Sarvananthan (executive director of investments) and Ahmad Shahizam Shariff (director of Khazanah’s Integrated Healthcare Holdings Ltd (IHHL)) were in for a surprise. Realisation set in that unlike Khazanah’s cosy rapport with TPG, built over the years, there was simply no chemistry with Fortis. That, and this – Khazanah’s disproportionate representation in the board (2 versus Fortis’ 4) and Fortis’ assertion for control soured the ties, driving a wedge between them.
“Fortis was in business with Khazanah. It wanted Fortis to acknowledge that both of them have significant stakes so there’s really no justification that there ought to be disproportionate say in how the company should be run. But Fortis wanted control from the outset,” claimed a source. “They asked Khazanah to have faith and show support but what that essentially meant is they wanted it their way,” said the source.
The Singh brothers – both Malvi and Shivi (Shivinder) are reputed to be very hands on in the companies they own and would not hesitate to change the status quo in companies they’ve bought into by upsetting the management line-up.
But those who work closely with them, scoff at that notion.
“They’ve got trusted people whom they’ve put in the right place in all their businesses. So, they don’t meddle on a micro level. If the managers are able and are true blue professionals, why remove them? The Singhs set the vision for the group. So, I don’t think it’s fair to say they want control or to upset the management structure at Parkway,” said a source close to the brothers.
Incidentally, in April this year, the brothers, with a combined net worth of US$3bil, stepped down from the board of Religare Enterprise, a one-stop financial services firm they founded in 1984, which sparked rumours of a possible sale of the financial arm to focus on their pet project – healthcare. The news of a possible sale has since been denied.
In place, they hired their trusted lieutenants, Sunil Godhwani and Shachindra Nath as chairman and CEO respectively of Religare, both of whom played key roles in advising the Singhs on the fight for Parkway.
Disproportionate board
Since Khazanah’s entry into Parkway, it has had only two nominee directors on the board while TPG, the other substantial shareholder had four. For as long as both parties worked together, this was never quite a niggling point although it was one that Khazanah had hoped to address, but unfortunately, just not quickly enough. Fortis’ entry into Parkway turned this into a vulnerable spot and a major headache for the investment arm.
Khazanah’s repeated plea to nominate two more directors – its executive director of the investments division and country head for India Michael Fernandes and Tunku Mahmood Fawzy (he retired from his post as ED of investments in May this year) to Parkway’s board had come to naught. Having deferred the decision several times, it is believed that the board, led by Fortis, finally rejected the nominations. “They did this skillfully and artfully. They just wanted it their way,” said a source.
By April, the cracks had widened by the whole nine yards. At Parkway’s AGM on April 16, a Khazanah representative, Quek Pei Lynn, director of IHHL, stood up and read out from a piece of paper, publicly expressing the fund’s dissatisfaction over the board structure from the governance standpoint. “Khazanah wanted to make its stance well known that it disagreed with the board composition and that the governance issues needed to be examined,” said parties familiar with the matter.
In May, Malvinder came to Malaysia to meet with Khazanah’s boss Tan Sri Azman Mokhtar for the first time in the latter’s office at the Petronas Twin Towers.
The meeting produced no substantial outcome. Meant to break the ice between the two men sitting at the helm of their respective entities, there was only one thing that emerged clear from the session – there were divergent boundaries in their views, vision, culture and mindset.
Khazanah was left with three choices – exit, increase its stake incrementally to outflank Fortis or launch a takeover of Parkway. The first was not compelling given that healthcare was a strategic piece in its portfolio, while the second would have resulted in a dead lock.
Even so, a source close to Khazanah says the fund was “not sentimental or emotional about the asset”. “If Fortis wanted control, they could have done it. We asked them to make us an offer which should be made to others as well,” he said.
All that, of course, is now very much water under the bridge.
The poker game
On May 27, Malaysia’s wealth fund launched a partial takeover offer for Parkway shares at S$3.78 per share. “I think Fortis would have been surprised that Khazanah had not rolled over and played dead but instead made this big step,” says an observer.
Then, on July 1, merely seven days before the first closing date of Khazanah’s offer, Fortis retaliated with a counter bid for Parkway shares at S$3.80 per share, a paltry two sen premium over Khazanah’s bid. But here’s what made its offer more compelling - it involved a voluntary general offer, erasing the concerns of shareholders ending up with odd lots under Khazanah’s partial offer.
It seemed enough to swing the votes.
“Fortis didn’t have to pay anymore than they had to. Also, their potential capital outlay would have been three times that of Khazanah as it involved a GO,” says an observer.
At this point, many perceived that Fortis had the upper hand. But in reality, while Khazanah had an acceptable exit plan (it could accept Fortis’ offer and walk away with a decent gain; its average investment cost in Parkway stood at between S$3.20 and S$3.40 per share), for Fortis, Khazanah’s partial offer signalled an imperfect exit. “A partial offer is different from a GO. They were unequal offers. Fortis’ block was large, hence an inability to properly exit (through Khazanah’s offer) as they would have a chunk left behind,” said an observer.
The market was abuzz on Khazanah’s next move. But when the time was up, Khazanah decided to extend the deadline, leaving many, including Fortis, guessing on its game plan.
Those from the Fortis camp must have been peeved. “By extending the partial offer on the same terms, is Khazanah confusing shareholders on its intentions for Parkway? Isn’t this ambiguity in intent or lack of transparency not beneficial to Parkway’s shareholders and business? Could it possibly point to a lack of internal buy-in or an inability to line up financing?” said a source close to Fortis.
It was clear that Khazanah’s move to extend the deadline was largely tactical. “Buying time is always a good tactic. When time is on your side, why not use it to your advantage? Let the other party sweat it out and build its own assumptions. Your first price should never be the last price, in any bidding position. Khazanah also knew that S$3.80 may not be Fortis’ last price and could be good for one or two revisions,” said the source.
With that, as the final closing date of July 26 (Monday) started looming closer, the stakes were getting higher for all the players in this heated tussle for the control of Parkway and more so for Fortis. This proved enough to draw both warring factions back to the table.
Late Thursday (July 22), the advisers for both sides were locked in intense negotiations.
“The advisers were caught up in lengthy negotiations but the principles (of both firms) were holding the strings,” said the source.
Fortis was willing to exit but they wanted Khazanah to make a GO, which the latter was already planning to do after talks with other shareholders of Parkway. “The negotiations were not getting anywhere till the concept of GO was introduced,” said the source.
After going back and forth and countless text messages that proceeded well into the weekend, both parties, after months of dispute and distrust finally arrived at a mutual point. On Monday, Khazanah launched its GO at S$3.95 per Parkway share or S$3.5bil (RM8.2bil) with Fortis giving an irrevocable undertaking to accept the offer. The offer closes on Aug 16.
Still, many were surprised. “Khazanah must have been surprised that it landed on this so quickly. It was preparing for a long, hard slog,” says an observer.
The Singh brothers provide the explanation. “Every investment is done with a price point, rationale and game plan in mind. There will be a point beyond which we won’t pay. We were not keen to enter into a bidding war,” Malvinder said this in an interview with India’s The Economic Times over the week. “Parkway is a great asset but there is a value attached to it. We were a buyer to the point of S$3.80 a share, which was itself a stretched offer,” he added.
Shivinder Singh said: “At the end of the day, you have to take an economic call. You can’t take an emotional call on the assets you want to own.”
Game over? Pretty much – or so, it would seem.
Khazanah emerges victor in its bid to control Parkway while Fortis walks away, far from broken hearted, with a fat pay cheque and gain of S$117mil for a four-month long investment.
Singapore Inc’s stance
One main bridge that Khazanah had to cross in making the takeover offer for Parkway is whether or not Singapore Inc would accept a Malaysian wealth fund taking control of a strategic Singaporean asset.
Truth is, Parkway, which had started out a Singapore-centric, single-hospital organisation and morphed into a major provider of premium integrated healthcare service provider in the Asia with 16 hospitals and 60 clinics all over the region, for long has been largely foreign owned. As such, the “patriotic issues” are not expected to stir much rumblings among Singaporeans.
Of course, the reverse stands in stark contrast. In 2005, when Parkway acquired a 31% controlling stake in Malaysia’s Pantai Holdings Bhd, the issue of a national strategic asset with two lucrative medical concessions under the control of foreigners turned into a political hot potato in Malaysia.
To soothe the frayed nerves of critics, Khazanah swooped in mid-2006 and set up a special purpose vehicle Pantai Irama to acquire Parkway’s stake in Pantai, thereafter taking the latter private. Parkway ended up with 40% in Pantai Irama while the rest was controlled by Khazanah. In 2008, Khazanah acquired a 16% stake in Parkway, which it has since raised to the current 24%.
On the spotlight
What had taken many, especially governance hawks by surprise, is a pact that Fortis had signed with three key directors of Parkway which was revealed in an offer document to shareholders on Khazanah’s partial takeover bid (see chart).
Even this, shouldn’t have been a major shock, to Khazanah that is, as it is believed that two of the directors, Richard Seow and Dr Lim Cheok Peng, had a similar pact previously with TPG.
The agreement was to allow Fortis the right to direct how they should vote at board and shareholder meetings. For as long as TPG was on the other side of this agreement, there was no beef as both TPG and Khazanah were on the same page on how they planned to drive the healthcare group.
This all changed with Fortis’ entry. The make-up of Fortis and TPG is vastly different. Unlike TPG which is a private equity firm, Fortis is a leading operator of healthcare assets. It founded and is running a huge Indian healthcare group with 48 hospitals and 101 healthcare centres across Asia. So, given its operational expertise, it can be appreciated if it had its own views on how best to steer Parkway.
“Parkway will benefit from the support and commitment of a focused strategic investor and its management. Five years of control by financial investors (read: Khazanah) has delivered limited benefit to Parkway,” a source close to Fortis had said earlier on in the tussle.
Interestingly, while Seow and Lim had entered into the agreement with Fortis on March 11, the same day Fortis had acquired the stake in Parkway from TPG, the third director, Dr Tan See Leng, the company’s managing director had sealed the deal a little later on March 26.
But here’s the crunch – with Fortis’ exit from Parkway, are these directors in for a handsome pay day? The contract with Fortis grants each director “a right to participate in certain economic benefits” in the event Fortis sells over 10% of its shares in Parkway.
“This may not be applicable if the contract stipulates a certain time frame for the agreement before the rights kick in, which may not match the current circumstances,” says an observer.
Whatever it is, it surely has outraged governance watchers: “This is an anathema to basic governance.”
Moral of the story
Let this saga, which thankfully didn’t stretch for longer than four months, be a lesson for both Fortis and Khazanah.
For Khazanah, this incident drives home the point on the vulnerabilities of investing in a company with a scattered shareholding and the importance of putting in place a structure, be it in terms of board composition or others, to safeguard its interest.
The lesson for Fortis, and no doubt for Khazanah as well, this tussle marks a classic do and don’t to avoid pitfalls for investors venturing into new markets – Never ever assume the markets they are entering into are the same as their own.
Otherwise, there’s always the risk of value overriding values.
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